INTEODUCTION
It has become accepted doctrine among economists that the rate of profit in the United States has declined since the mid-1960s. What L less a matter of agreement is whether this decline represents a stage in a long-term secular decline. In a recent article, Dumeail, Glick, and Range1 ( 1017) reviewed the existing empirical evidence on this topic and found that, independent of variation in the definition of the rate of profit. any series extending back to 1939 reveals artable or increving trend. Although two periods of serious decline exist (after World War I and in the Iate 196Os), they are connected by a 'leap forward" during World War IL In fact, in any measure which doee not subtract taxes from profit, World War II coincides with a considerable restoration of the rate of profit. This is an important anomaly for Marxists who predict a iongterm deciining tendency, yet it ha never been addressed in the empirical literature on this topic.
There is no doubt that a restoration of the rate of profit discovered in the 1940s questions the relevance of Marx's famous the& of a falling tendency of the rate of profit in capitalist economies. Certainly when Mux discussed the tendency of the rate of profit he acknowledged the important role of countertendencies.
However, one would not expect the counter tendencies which Marx discussed to have such a concentrated impact over such a short span of time.
The purpose of the present study is to investigate more carefully this leap forward in profitability.
In a first pm, we will fully explore the statistical characteristics of the leap forward.
Specifically, we wilI compare the leap forward with earlier and future fluctuations and trends in profitability (an effort will be made, in spite of the deficiencies of the data. to cover a period of 120 years). We will further determine whether the leap forward is invariant to the choice of the definition of the rate of profit or whether it can be explained by a specific choice of statistical categories. .4 second part will consider whether the leap forward is the expression of changes in the relative price of fured capital, or a variation in the workweek of capital. The final part will explore whether the leap occured in specific industries, or whether it was a general feature of the economy. In the conciusioa we will discuss a number of further alternative explanations.
Any analysis of the World. War II period will be piagued by a lack of accurate data. In what follows we will draw on a variety of sources in order to fill in gaps and to check our calculations.
The most reliable data come from the National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA, B.E.A. ISW~I).
These data are available since 1929 and stocks of capital from the Bureau of Economic .4naiysis (BE& l3 
I -HISTORICAL TRENDS
The remarkable and sustained recovery during the 1940s is truly an anomaly when compared with the historical trend.
In order to illustrate this phenomenon, section A will consider the long-term trend in the rate of pro6t since 1869. Section B then decomposes this rate of profit into the share of profits in total income and the output to capital ratio (what we will call the productivity of capital).
A third section will compare our long-term profit race series with the same rate of profit variable for an overlap of years, as a check on the accuracy of our data. Finally, we will consider the impact of taxation for these years.
A -THE RATE OF PROFIT SINCE 1869
In a previous article (DUM$NIL 
B -THE SHARE OF PROFITS IN NATIONAL INCOME AND THE PRODUCTWITY OF CAPITAL
In order to gain further insight in the puzzling occurence of the leap, it is often helpful to decompose the rate of profit bs the product of the productivity of capital:
The results of this decomposition are presented in figures are those used in figure 1. 
C -THE RATE OF PROFIT SINCE THE LATE 1920s
In order to check the reliability of our previous long-run measure of the rate of profit, we compare it in this section with data from the ?iational ,,,,, ,,:.,., 1860 ,,,,, ,,:.,., 1870 ,,,,, ,,:.,., 1880 ,,,,, ,,:.,., 1890 ,,,,, ,,:.,., 19&J 1910 ,,,,, ,,:.,., 19'9 1930 ,,,,, ,,:.,., 1940 ,,,,, ,,:.,., 1950 ,,,,, ,,:.,., li60 1970 Figure 3 
HISTORICAL TREiVDS
In addition.
the following is of note : In order to assess the relative impact of the two types of taxes. we compute the share of taxes in total income. The result of this computation is dispiayed in figure   9 . Consider, first, indirect business t-s. result from a fall in the relative price of fixed capital (an important countertendency listed by Marx). This is not the fact situation of the leap forward.
In figure 11 , the relative price of capital as compared to GNP is plotted. From 1869 to 1925, only the ratio of the investment deflator to the GNP deflator is available.
After 1925, it is also possible to compute the relative price of the stock of capital.
The two ratios reveal the same upward trend. The rise of the price of capital goods has always been steeper than that of GNP, the reverse of the expected pattern.
.4nd
in spite of important fluctuations, no rupture can be located during World' War II.
When the productivity of capital is measured in real terms (deflated numerator and denominator) in Figure 12 , the leap forward becomes even more pronounced !
The !vIarxist literature rarely refers to the productivity of capital (a term we use for its recognition by economists) but instead to a less discussed variable : the "organic composition" of capital.
In -Marxist terms it is the ratio of constant to variable capital. 1925 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 Year Figure 14 This stock based measure of the organic composition of capital is d&played in figure 13 . The difference in the trends before and after World War II is striking.
The rupture corresponding to the leap forward in profitability is again apparent, during the war. We consider now the same decomposition using IRS data base. The results are presented in figure 16 . Here we find a discrepancy between the results we obtain from the IRS data base and the SIPA data base. As figure 16 illustrates, in the IRS dat'a base, the leap forward appears in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing. This Independently of the source used. the gap between the rate of profit in iManufacturing and the ocher sectors is puzzling. A portion of this difference is due to the measure of capital used in the definitions of the race of profit. We know from previous research (cf. CLICK M. lo&.) that rates of profit measured on equity are more equalized between industries than races of return measured on the stock of fixed capital.
The value of equity is available from IRS data. The rates of profit for Manufacturing and Nonmanufacturing using a measure of the race of profit on equity is displayed in figure 17 . The difference between the two sectors is considerably reduced.
but the leap forward in profitability is still apparent for both sectors.
B -EIGHT IIWUSTRIES (IRS) -
Using IRS data. it is pnsgible to breakdown the Nonmanufacturing sector of x'*m .a . Future research is certainly necessary to more fully understand the mechanisms which underlie the recovery of profitability.
We have tried to offer some guidance in this conclusion as to where we believe further investigation would be most fruitful.
The main contribution of this paper has been to expose the dimensions and characteristics of the recovery of profitability in the World War II years and after. This phenomenon has critical importance for any analysis of long-run secular trends in the U.S. rate of profit, yet it has surprisingly evaded attention until now.
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